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ABSTRACT
Soft errors are an ubiquitous, ever-increasing problem that will compromise future com-
puting integrity at every echelon. Many architectures provide protection from these tran-
sient events for large arrays, such as register files and caches, but often, little is done to
protect common latches from corruption, such as those used in configuration and in the
pipeline. It is important that we identify the most vulnerable processor components at
the latch level, so as to mitigate soft errors before they manifest in architectural state.
This research evaluates the vulnerability of latches within an IBM PowerPC-based pro-
cessor core. We simulate a VHDL model of the processor and use an RTX error injection
methodology to inject bit-flips into the latch output nets at runtime. We then perform
an analysis of the system’s behavior while executing various TST applications, paying
particular attention to the floating point unit, and propose solutions to increase processor
robustness.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Soft errors, also known as transient faults or single event upsets (SEUs), are a subject of
increasing concern among computer architects. These errors manifest as instantaneous
inversions of the logical values held in transistors, resulting in signal corruptions. For
many consumers, for this to happen even once would be unacceptable, particularly for
servers controlling bank transactions, voter information, national security intelligence,
and countless other applications. In this chapter we discuss the causes of soft errors and
the problems they can create.
1.1 Soft Error Sources
Any type of electronic noise can alter the state of a circuit, but usually this noise is gen-
erated by highly energized particles impacting the transistor substrate (Figure 1.1). The
most common such high-energy particles are neutrons originating from cosmic rays and
alpha particles emitted by manufacturing impurities and packaging decay. Ziegler et
al. provide a comprehensive historical account of our understanding of these phenom-
ena [20].
Cosmic rays are extraterrestrial radiation that continuously bombard the atmosphere.
As they penetrate to sea level they split into various atomic particles, of which neutrons
have been found to be the most problematic. Most are absorbed and lose their energy, but
enough survive to create a constant influx of these particles all around us. To humans and
other life forms they are harmless, but to an electronic element measured in nanometers
they can be significant. Because attenuation of energy depends on the distance traveled
through the atmosphere, altitude plays a substantial role in a processor’s soft error rate
(SER). A barrier against neutron bombardment would require several feet of concrete
— clearly not a viable mainstream option.
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Figure 1.1: An Energized Particle Collision (courtesy of Pia Sanda)
All materials contain slight traces of radioactive substances, and so radioactive decay
in electronic packaging is inevitable. Although less of a problem than cosmic rays, since
measures can be taken to prevent contamination in manufacturing and since shielding
is a realistic option, it still contributes to SER. Alpha particles are the most destructive
result of packaging decay.
When these energized particles interact with semiconductor atoms at a particular
node, the charge distribution can be disturbed sufficiently to modify the voltage level of
the node’s signal. The effect is temporary and does not damage the transistor (hence the
term ”soft” error), but the resulting mutation in a piece of data can propagate and create
a lasting inconsistency. The extent of the disturbance is largely dependent on internal
device characteristics such as capacitance and voltage threshold. A larger device with
more capacitance is more robust against the creation of artificial current channels, and
a larger voltage range requires a greater electron displacement to switch its interpreted
logic level. As a result, device technology scaling is dramatically increasing observed
SERs. A recent study by Karnik, Hazucha and Patel quantifies the relationship between
SER and technology scaling, and they conclude that increased efforts to reduce soft er-
rors are needed to maintain current product reliability [5]. The problem also increases
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with chip area: the larger the chip, the more often (statistically speaking) an error will
occur. It follows that larger systems with multiple chips are several times more vulner-
able than their smaller, simpler counterparts. Although the FIT (failures in time) rate
of any individual processor is relatively low, it compounds in multiprocessors, compute
clusters, servers, and especially supercomputers, and becomes nontrivial for these large
systems.
1.2 The Soft Error Dilemma
It is an unfortunate reality that soft error vulnerability scales with processor speed. A
fast processor is likely to come with a large area, small device sizes, and the efficient
utilization of resources, which means that a transient fault is not only more likely to
appear but is also more likely to affect an important piece of data. In a consumer-driven
market, sacrificing performance to avoid fault manifestation is often not desirable. Thus,
the question involves not how to avoid soft errors altogether but rather how to pacify
them once they have occurred. In order to do this it is important to understand how
architectures respond in the presence of soft errors, so that targeted error mitigation
mechanisms that minimize overhead yet maintain reliability and performance can be
installed.
Once a transient fault has materialized in a circuit it does not necessarily translate
into faulty program behavior. Often the affected resource will be idle and its result
ignored anyway. Combinational logic and architectural dataflow also naturally mask
many soft errors and prevent them from entering machine state. An altered ”don’t care”
condition (for example, an input to an AND logic gate where the other input is already
a ’0’) and a mux input that is not selected are common instances of architectural fault-
masking. The percent of errors that are absorbed like this will vary depending on the
architecture and the application.
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In the event that an error does propagate to machine state, i.e., the register file, cache,
or a state holding latch, it can become visible to the user in a variety of ways. Some may
be detected by hardware via an exception or an unrecoverable failure that results in a
system crash. Others may generate infinite loops and cause hangs. These are relatively
harmless in the sense that the computation can be restarted and only time will be lost.
A far worse scenario is the case of silent data corruption (SDC), in which an undetected
error propagates to the program output and the user is given erroneous data.
1.3 Motivation
Because SER is so highly dependent on the type and design of an architecture, it is nec-
essary to analyze the behavior of soft errors on the system in question before installing
error detection and correction features. We therefore investigate the vulnerability of a
new PowerPC-based IBM processor core and floating point unit, and observe how this
particular processor reacts to transient fault injection. Unlike other SER studies that uti-
lize generic architectural simulators, this research employs the VHDL model of the core
design and authentic verification techniques used in product testing. Our results reflect
the accurate response of a real processor in production.
Most public simulators are also limited by computation granularity. Fault injection
into these tools can only be performed at the instruction level, into large arrays such as
caches and register files. Injection into individual latches is not feasible. However, large
arrays are easily protected by ECC (error correcting codes) and, in fact, usually are in
modern architectures (ours is no exception). Latches, on the other hand, such as those
in the pipeline or those that hold state and configuration, are equally vulnerable and yet
often unprotected. Modeling errors that propagate into state by injecting the state itself
is largely unhelpful because at that point the error will be unrecoverable, and our goal
is error recovery. The more detailed simulations needed to model latch transactions are
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far more time-consuming, and as a result, there is a dearth of research performed at
this level. Yet it is critical that we understand what happens in detail: the frequency
of propagation into machine state, the types of errors generated, and the categories of
latches with the highest susceptibility.
It should be noted that the problem of soft errors is industry-wide and is in no way
specific to IBM or any other company. The results presented in this paper reflect only the
behavior of faults that have already manifested; they are completely independent of the
rate of fault appearance. In other words we make no statement about this processor’s raw
likelihood of failure. This is merely a commentary on the architecture’s vulnerability in
the rare event that a fault should occur.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
We model soft errors by injecting bit-flips into latches at runtime, i.e., by forcing a
latch’s output signal value from 0 to 1 or vice versa, and perform our experiments on
the VHDL model of a PowerPC-based IBM processor core, executed with the IBM
Mesa simulator. The core itself is small and multithreaded, and contains many high-
performance features typical of modern processors. The Mesa simulator, combined
with our RTX verification methodology, provides fine-grained error detection capabil-
ities unavailable in most public architectural simulators, where errors are usually left
undetected until they reach a processor pin. In this work we pinpoint exactly where in
the microarchitecture an error first appears, and thus we detect errors much sooner af-
ter their injection. In addition, our methodology is capable of detecting fault conditions
which degrade performance but do not introduce failures, such as branch mispredictions,
while pin checking approaches lack this ability. In the following section we describe this
methodology, implemented on the platform hierarchy illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.1 The RTX Environment
In order to detect the appearance of a propagated error we use a tool called RTX (run-
time executable), based on a framework called Fusion that drives the Mesa simulator.
It is used in verification at IBM. RTX continuously monitors all simulation events such
as state modification, cache transactions, and instruction issuing and retirement, and
dynamically verifies this against a known correct trace of the application. Upon encoun-
tering an illegal operation or an invalid data value it reports the error and terminates the
simulation. Using this environment it is possible to pinpoint the exact location in the
microarchitecture that our injected fault becomes an unrecoverable error, unlike other
infrastructures that can only provide high-level feedback from the user’s perspective.
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of Tools and Platforms
Figure 2.2: Experimental Process
To access latch signals we utilize an error injection library inherited from the IBM Z-
series reliability team and adapt it to our VHDL model. The library uses a Fusion-based
environment called FLite (Fusion Lite) that improves usability for RTX; all error injec-
tion takes place within this FLite framework. Before Mesa is launched, FLite initializes
and instructs the simulator to suspend execution when a fault is to be injected and to
temporarily yield control to the FLite module at that time. After the fault is introduced,
control is passed back to the simulator. This process is shown graphically in Figure 2.2.
Within the FLite module, user-specified parameters control which latch gets injected
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and at which cycle the injection is performed. The specified latch name (given as a
string) is first parsed, and a handle is assigned to the corresponding RTX facility. Fa-
cilities are RTX objects that map to each VHDL net, providing a means to track and
manipulate signal values in the simulator. For us they are the gateway for the dynamic
introduction of bit-flips. Now because individual latches, each holding a single bit of
data, are often grouped to hold multi-bit data, the term ”latch” is generically assigned
to any such grouping of variable width. So in addition to a latch name we specify a
bit within the group to corrupt, and our FLite module inverts the sense of that bit in
the facility. To communicate the name of the latch to inject, a list of every latch name
in the entire model is given in a text file. The list comprises the subset of names in
the model’s netlist with a common latch suffix, excluding arrays that have existing soft
error protection (such as register file internals) and certain elements that are disabled
during normal operation (such as ABIST, or array built-in self test). This study is thus
limited to unprotected latches that are most likely to be in use at any given time. Upon
FLite invocation the latch list is copied into an array of strings, and the latch that will be
targeted for that simulation is chosen with a random index into this array.
More often than not, an injected error will not cause a user-visible error, and for this
reason some techniques inject multiple errors into a single simulation, for the purpose of
obtaining more interesting results in less time. We opt for the more realistic approach of
injecting only one bit-flip per simulation and allowing the program to run to completion.
This is not only representative of how soft errors are likely to materialize in practice,
but also enables us to identify a solid cause-and-effect between each injected fault and
resulting simulation error. We compensate the small fraction of ”interesting” runs with
numbers across the board. With over 6000 latches in the simulation space consisting of
over 70,000 individual latch bits, and with a range of up to 10,000 potential injection
times, the number of runs required to ensure statistical significance in our results is
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large: to be accurate to within 1% with 99% confidence, over 16,000 are needed per
application. With the help of IBM’s vast computing resources and a little automation,
this was achievable.
A Perl script controls the randomization of injection parameters and supervises the
job queue. The first parameter, latch name, is simply a random number between zero
and the total number of latches being tested (to be used as an array index, as previously
discussed). The valid range for the second parameter, latch bit, varies across latches,
and therefore requires a mapping between each latch and its width. We append to our
existing list of latch names the total number of bits in each latch, and the chosen index
then yields both a net name and an upper bound for the latch bit parameter. Finally,
we randomize the time of injection, whose range is limited to the duration of the main
loop in each program, such that no fault is ever injected during the uncharacteristic
phases of the code (i.e., the beginning and the end). The range is also cut prior to the
end of the final iteration, with the aim to capture error propagation characteristically
as well. Within the range, injection time is further restricted to always occur at the
same point in a cycle, made possible because each processor cycle is actually equivalent
to four simulation cycles. One additional parameter called the Fusion masterseed is
always set to the same constant; this ensures that all hardware design variables such as
memory latency and cache miss rate are identical across simulations and that we are
always comparing apples to apples. This also ensures determinism and reproducibility
in our results. All of these parameters are passed to FLite via a separate file that must
be unique for each run, and thus a script keeps as many parameter files in existence as
there are spawned jobs. The script submits jobs until a user-defined limit is reached, but
also monitors the queue size and suspends job submission when the queue starts to get
overwhelmed.
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2.2 TST Test Cases
The requisite test cases for RTX have a special format known as a TST. TSTs are short
instruction sequences, usually containing on the order of tens of instructions, that are
used to verify hardware functionality but do not necessarily compute anything meaning-
ful. In addition to instructions themselves, the format provides complete information as
to what data is computed and what the architectural state should look like before and
after each instruction. Verification is performed on VHDL models by comparing these
traces to what occurs in the simulator and reporting discrepancies. Not surprisingly,
TSTs are exceptionally slow to execute, which is why they ordinarily are not created
with any connection to a real application, but because soft errors are data dependent it
was necessary for us to create this link in our experiments.
Using the kernel source code for two major floating point applications, we created
four distinct, industry-relevant TSTs. This was done primarily with the help of an IBM
tool called GPro that generates TST files from assembly-based input. Assembly code ex-
tracted from the source files underwent the extensive manual process of conversion to the
PowerPC architecture, followed by conversion to the GPro format, followed by a filter-
ing of unsupported instructions and conflicting addresses, and finally GPro compilation
into a TST. Because TSTs typically do not represent real applications, no infrastruc-
ture exists to make this slow transformation, and as a result, time constraints prohibited
the acquisition of more than four benchmarks. Each of the applications was converted
into two TSTs: one with a single thread of execution and one with four threads. The
multi-threaded version in each case is simply a four-way replication of the same code on
different sets of data, thus multiplying the total workload by four. Because a thorough
translation of the full applications would have yielded TSTs over 800,000 lines long, we
use only the kernel and execute the most significant portion of the applications in a few
thousand instructions.
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Table 2.1: TST Attribute Summary
Instruction Count CPI
QCD: 1 thread 2572 5.010
QCD: 4 threads 8876 1.488
DGEMM: 1 thread 1112 3.731
DGEMM: 4 threads 4448 1.108
Table 2.2: TST Instruction Mix
Control Floating Point Integer Memory
QCD 6% 78% 12% 4%
DGEMM 2% 55% 15% 28%
Our chosen applications for this study are QCD and DGEMM, two floating point
intensive programs. A summary of their attributes is shown in Table 2.1. For each TST
we list the number of instructions executed and the simulated CPI1as reported by RTX.
QCD models lattice quantum chromodynamics and serves as our mainstream bench-
mark with a pretty typical workload. DGEMM, a matrix multiplier, is more of a worst-
case application, with efficient pipeline utilization and above average throughput. QCD
is also about twice as large as DGEMM. In Table 2.2 we provide the relative contribu-
tions of primary instruction categories found in each application, keeping in mind that
loops have already been unrolled. Although targeted for a floating point study, there is
no shortage of integer instructions in either TST, and they both sufficiently tax the entire
processor to obtain a comprehensive set of results.
1Actual CPI numbers from performance testing of the DGEMM executable on a verified pre-hardware
simulator were found to be 3.85779 with a single thread of execution and 1.09982 with four threads.
Simulator incompatibility with the QCD executable prevented the verification of our QCD CPI numbers.
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2.3 Analysis Techniques
There is no doubt that absolute error percentage is a valuable statistic. After all, users
only see and care about how often they witness a failure. However, reducing the raw
SER requires more knowledge about hardware status at the time of a fault. Therefore,
from a design perspective we are interested not only in how often errors occur, but what
the conditions surrounding each error are. One important such condition is the status of
the latch at the time of corruption. If we know that the latch was not carrying sensitive
data we learn nothing about how robust the hardware is. Luckily our host processor
utilizes clock gating to reduce power consumption on latches that are not needed for
the current computation. By probing the clock signal of the latch we inject, we can
determine which latches are inactive and which at least have the potential to propagate
an injected fault. We inspect a simulation waveform to see when clock periods start,
to verify that probing always occurs when the signal should be at a logic ’1’. Since
injection always takes place at the same point in a cycle, we simply have FLite probe
the clock at a constant offset from our chosen injection point. For most latches in the
model, the net names for the output and clock signals differ only in the suffix, allowing
us to obtain the clock net name directly from the latch name. There are a few that do not
have this trait, so we implement a small fix in the model to create aliases to the clock
signals in this rare case. With this modification all clock nets can be produced through
string manipulation in Perl.
As mentioned previously, our VHDL model often groups multiple latches together
and provides all of them with a single net name, making purely uniform error injec-
tion difficult. In our methodology we randomize injections uniformly across latches,
ignoring width. This skews our results in favor of smaller latches, whose bits contribute
more to overall vulnerability than they would in reality. To compensate, we weight the
number of fault injections and failures seen for a particular latch by the number of bits
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in the latch, so that the distribution of injections more closely resembles a uniform one.
This, of course, assumes that latches will exhibit homogeneous behavior for all bits, but
since they are grouped for the very reason that they share a common function, this is a
fair assumption to make. A good subject of future research would be to replicate these
experiments accounting for latch width, but for our purposes this seems unnecessary,
particularly since small latch behavior is still of high interest and decreasing its fre-
quency in our results is not desirable. Consequently, some results we report have been
weighted to help relieve bias toward smaller latches.
In many of our experiments we account for a set of latches in the model with a hard-
ened design style. These more robust latches are assigned to important state-holding
elements in the execution, instruction, and memory management units, and in practice
will be less susceptible to fault manifestation. SEU hardening of this sort can be im-
plemented using a variety of different methods, ranging from increasing the capacitance
at the transistor node (as in [6]) to adding error-correcting feedback circuitry to the
latch (as in [7]). Krishnamohan and Mahapatra provide an analysis of different types of
hardening techniques in [8]. Improving latch robustness invariably requires additional
overhead, so these techniques are not used for every latch in the processor. We therefore
consider the diversity of latch designs in our analysis of architectural reliability.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
In this section we outline the results of our experiments. The first set of results reflects
the complete space of latches chosen for the study, while the second set extracts the
aforementioned set of latches with a hardened design style. We present an overview of
processor vulnerability for the worst-case scenario in which these latches will still carry
faults, followed by a detailed analysis of the more likely scenario in which they will be
resilient against soft errors. Finally, we conduct a different experiment designed to test
SER uniformity within a single floating point latch.
3.1 Worst-Case Results
Figure 3.1 summarizes the results for each of the four TSTs, comparing the ratios of
runs that pass and fail with injections into active (clocked) and idle (not clocked) latches.
These results are based on pools of more than 20,000 simulations for each TST. Runs
that pass are simulations that successfully complete with no anomaly detected by RTX;
there is never any corrupted state found in the architecture nor any unexpected operation.
Failed runs that were not clocked represent the small fraction of injections directly into
state-holding latches, where RTX detects their presence immediately after injection. The
plots show that even assuming every member of our hardened latch set fails, between
80% and 88% of all faults are absorbed in the architecture. The multi-threaded TSTs are
more vulnerable than their single-threaded counterparts by 5% and 8% for DGEMM and
QCD, respectively. QCD does not harbor fewer failures than DGEMM, despite having
a larger CPI and a slightly larger percentage of injections into clock gated latches (1%).
Thread-level parallelism appears to have a much greater effect on error rates than does
instruction-level parallelism.
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Figure 3.1: Summary of Worst-Case Results
It is important to note that even clocked runs that fail RTX may not necessarily result
in program output corruption. It is possible that a corrupt state-holding element, for
example, will never be used and thus never propagate its fault anywhere. However, once
an error appears in state, it will remain until overwritten or until the thread completes.
State errors are therefore likely to cause problems, and even within the same application
will become more problematic with increased runtime or input size. Their presence
greatly increases the potential for corruption and should consequently be avoided if
economically feasible to do so.
We further break down the results into the major units of the processor, which are the
pervasive unit (used primarily for debugging), the instruction unit, the integer execution
unit, the memory management unit, the floating point unit, and the boxes unit (used
for mailbox communication). Table 3.1 lists these units and their abbreviations, which
we will use from this point on. Also listed in the table are the relative sizes of each
15
Table 3.1: Processor Units
Function Latches Latch Bits
A PCQ Pervasive Unit 79 1690
IUB Instruction Unit 1499 15577
A XUQ Integer Execution Unit 3269 29598
A MMQ Memory Management Unit 552 7592
F4B Floating Point Unit 403 13468
BX Boxes Unit 155 2129
unit, given as both the number of latches and the number of latch bits devoted to that
unit. A PCQ and BX are relatively diminutive, and so we omit them from many of
our analyses. Figure 3.2 categorizes the results by the other four units embodying the
processor core. The execution unit dominates the latch bit count in the processor, and so
it is not surprising that it also dominates the percentage of passed and failed runs, even
though our TSTs consist primarily of floating point instructions.
3.2 Representative Results
We now take the hardened latch set into account. These more resilient latches are found
only in the IUB, A MMQ, and A XUQ, and comprise no more than 5% of each TST’s
pool of simulations. We filter these runs from the dataset using a Perl script, and report
SERs more representative of what this architecture will exhibit in reality. The summary
of this new subset of results is shown in Figure 3.3. Error rates actually improve by about
4% for all TSTs because the hardened style was assigned mostly to state-holding special
purpose registers (SPRs), which almost always generate automatic failures for RTX.
Figure 3.4 shows the new results organized by the four main processor components.
All three units with hardened latches demonstrate lower SERs in the new results, but
A MMQ, in particular, transforms from a significant source of failures into the most
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Figure 3.2: Worst-Case Results by Unit
resilient major component in the processor. Judging from the figure, this unit inherently
does not have a tendency to propagate errors and is most susceptible via direct state latch
particle strikes. Protecting these SPRs to resist fault manifestation in the first place can
dramatically improve SERs.
3.2.1 Unit Breakdown
Since units vary widely by size, we need to isolate the results for each unit to determine
its vulnerability. Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 portray the characteristics of the IUB,
A XUQ, A MMQ, and F4B components, respectively. IUB and A XUQ suffer the most
from soft errors, despite having many of their state-holding elements removed from their
datasets. Heavy utilization of these components probably influences the SER but is not
the sole contributor, since the TSTs were chosen to stress the floating point unit as well.
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Figure 3.3: Summary of Results (No Hardened Latches)
A MMQ not only boasts a 90% or more success rate, but it does so without a single
injection into an inactive latch. The reason is that the VHDL model is still in production,
and clock gating has not yet been added to the memory management unit. In fact, the
floating point unit is the only component with extensive clock gating, as evidenced by
the large percentage of injections into idle latches. It may not be coincidental that the
floating point unit also has one of the smallest failure rates. Since our applications
are primarily floating point in nature, one would expect F4B to be more vulnerable
than A XUQ, but this is not the case, and it is unlikely that the extreme disparity in
clock gating schemes between the two components has no influence. Reasons for clock
gating do not exclusively involve turning off elements with no effect on upstream logic;
architects often wish to preserve latch data while reducing power consumption. A clock-
gated latch prevents a fault from entering the feedback loop and becoming a lasting
artifact, while a latch that remains unnecessarily active can still unintentionally retain
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Figure 3.4: Results by Unit (No Hardened Latches)
and propagate an error. Thus it is logical that the unit with more thorough clock gating
displays greater soft error resilience. Clock gating may be primarily a power-saving
mechanism, but it offers data protection as well.
3.2.2 Failure Types
Fault injection produces a wide variety of errors reported by RTX. Figure 3.9 shows the
most common of these errors for each TST (among injections into active latches). Idle
latch injections that lead to failures are omitted because they almost universally cause
IBI (instruction by instruction) miscompares of some type and are most likely state
miscompares found at the point of injection. They do not provide any useful information
about soft error propagation behavior. The difference between the two flavors of IBI
miscompares pertains to the type of latch in which an error is found, but for our purposes
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Figure 3.5: Instruction Unit Results
Figure 3.6: Execution Unit Results
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Figure 3.7: Memory Management Unit Results
Figure 3.8: Floating Point Unit Results
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Figure 3.9: Failure Type Distribution
they are one and the same: they are both errors found in architectural state. The figure
shows that most faults manifest as IBI miscompares. The data still contain a few SPRs
that are not targeted for a hardened design style and that are clocked at the point of
injection, contributing somewhat to these state miscompares, but the vast majority of
faults here were not injected directly into state. According to these results, most faults
end up propagating into state nonetheless.
The second significant failure category involves discrepancies found in the hardware
and software caches (shown in dark blue in the figure). This failure type is generically
assigned to any cache inconsistency, but the bulk of it is found in valid or lock bits.
Interestingly, this error type is far more prominent among single-threaded failures. The
single-threaded TSTs are also the only ones issuing instructions for disabled threads,
which makes sense; the multi-threaded TSTs utilize all four threads supported by the ar-
chitecture and will never encounter a disabled one. We can assume that multi-threaded
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TSTs also attempt to issue instructions for the wrong thread but cannot detect the prob-
lem at issue, since all threads are enabled. Instead, these errors probably manifest as
either more state miscompares or hangs, types comprising a greater percentage of total
failures in the multi-threaded TSTs.
3.2.3 Failure Rates by Component
Figure 3.10 plots the percentage of runs that fail due to injections in each processor unit,
both overall and only among clocked injections. Unlike the charts in previous sections,
these contain data weighted by latch width. A PCQ and BX actually are two of the
most vulnerable units, but this is due almost entirely to SPRs, since the fail rates of both
units plummet when only active latches are considered. They could both benefit from
the more resilient latch design, although whether the installation would be cost effective
for such small components is debatable. A MMQ is the most robust unit, displaying
no more than a 3% error rate for any TST. A XUQ, on the other hand, is a global
source of error, with an average fail rate of 10%. IUB and F4B also reveal substantial
SERs, although their error rates seem to be much more dependent on the application and
number of threads.
Now that we’ve identified A XUQ, IUB, and F4B as the most susceptible compo-
nents, we look more closely at unit internals. Figures 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 plot the fail-
ure rates of each sub-component in those major units, respectively. A XUQ has a group
of unprotected SPRs that fail mostly when not clocked, and several other modules that
rarely propagate faults from unclocked injections. Multi-threaded QCD has a more vul-
nerable load-store unit than any other TST, while multi-threaded DGEMM stresses the
fixed-point unit most. XU CPL is globally the most vulnerable, with LSUCMD close
behind. IUB and F4B also display similar results when comparing all injections to only
clocked ones, each with the exception of a single component containing unprotected
23
Figure 3.10: Comparison of Unit Failure Rates
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SPRs (IUQ MISC0 for IUB, and DLSP for F4B). In both of these units, multi-threaded
DGEMM yields the highest SER vulnerability.
3.2.4 Error Detection Times
Often we wish to know not only where a failure occurs and what error it causes, but how
long it takes to discover that error. Cumulative histograms plotting the number of runs
that detect errors in each time interval are shown in Figure 3.14. The data for these charts
include only those errors detected before program completion, omitting hangs and end-
of-test miscompares, and include only clocked injections. The overwhelming majority
of errors are detected soon after injection. Eighty percent of failures are discovered
within 12 and 25 cycles for single- and multi-threaded DGEMM, and within 49 and 108
cycles for single- and multi-threaded QCD. The data imply that the probability of error
discovery at any given point is application dependent. Faults hide in QCD much more
readily than they do in DGEMM, and even after 2500 cycles, 5% of QCD errors have
yet to surface. Multi-threaded TSTs harbor errors longer than single-threaded ones, due
probably in part to the lack of instructions issued for disabled threads.
3.3 Latch Nonuniformity
Thus far we have assumed that all bits within the same latch grouping perform identi-
cally, or close to it. There are, however, a few latches in the design that may not con-
form to this assumption. For instance, floating point data may be subject to rounding,
and latch bits carrying the least significant portions of the data will be less vulnerable,
since corruptions to those bits will be lost along with the rest of the discarded precision.
To test this idea we execute a separate set of simulations, this time injecting only into
a single latch suspected of exhibiting nonuniformity. This latch holds the 110-bit result
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Figure 3.11: Execution Unit Failure Rates
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Figure 3.12: Instruction Unit Failure Rates
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Figure 3.13: Floating Point Unit Failure Rates
28
Figure 3.14: Cumulative Histograms: Time from Injection to Detection
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Figure 3.15: Failure Rates Across a Floating Point Latch:
F4B.MAD0.FADD.EX4 RES LO LAT
of a multiplication operation that is eventually reduced to a 52-bit operand, resulting
in a large portion of the latch contributing only to rounding. Approximately 10,000
simulations are run for each of the single- and multi-threaded TSTs.
Figure 3.15 depicts the behavior of a floating point latch heavily used by QCD, both
overall and only when clocked (DGEMM does not use this latch often enough to pro-
vide data for comparison). Failure rates for each bit in the latch are plotted (zoomed in
to 50%) with the most significant bit on the left. The plots show that the SER is un-
questionably not uniform across this particular latch type. The most significant half of
the latch has, on average, a 1.9% overall / 10.4% clocked error rate for single-threaded
QCD and a 9.7% overall / 23.0% clocked error rate for multi-threaded QCD, but the least
significant half is completely error-free in all cases. There is a well defined boundary be-
tween the two halves of the latch, evidence of where the rounding occurs. This unusual
hardware element displays above average susceptibility for half of its data, and based on
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our sampling of injections what could be complete immunity to transient faults for the
other half. Although latches of this type will not be represented as well by weighting
individual injections by latch width, there are only two distinct regions with conflicting
behavior, and sufficient sampling of the latch will still capture an accurate approxima-
tion of its average SER.
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CHAPTER 4
RELATED WORK
We discuss in this section research that others have performed in the areas of fault injec-
tion and soft error vulnerability analysis. There have been many studies executed with
various implementations and platforms; we mention the most relevant here.
4.1 Fault Injection Studies
Sanda et al. [14] study the soft error resilience of the IBM POWER6 processor using
four experiments: proton beam irradiation, fault injection into architected state of the
Mambo simulator, statistical fault injection (SFI) into latches of a hardware-emulated
RTL model, and neutron beam irradiation. Their goal, like ours, is to determine pro-
cessor vulnerability, although their target architecture is one designed specifically to be
robust against soft errors, while our processor has virtually no existing soft error pro-
tection. The SFI experiment, which most closely resembles our own methodology, is
described in greater detail by Ramachandran et al. [13]. They obtain greater simula-
tion speed compared to traditional software simulators, but lack the fine-grained error
detection capability of RTX.
Wang et al. [18] perform fault injection into latch outputs of an Alpha-based Ver-
ilog processor model. They estimate the extent of fault masking and identify vulnerable
processor components, and repeat their experiments with some basic protection mech-
anisms installed. They report numbers similar to ours but use a model developed in an
academic environment, representing a processor that does not actually exist, and they
also suffer from a lack of detail in their error detection methodology.
In [2], Blome et al. inject faults into a Verilog model of an ARM processor. Their
framework supports injection into both sequential and combinational elements, and they
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conduct an analysis of error propagation with respect to both types. Instead of identify-
ing error types and error-prone processor locations as we do, they focus more on logical
masking rates and general error propagation behavior.
Bronevetsky and de Supinski [3] study the effects of fault injection on iterative lin-
ear algebra methods. They employ a high-level technique that injects faults into the
data structures of massively parallel applications, and classify errors based on program
output. They also propose checkpoint-based fault tolerance mechanisms and perform
analyses on the accompanying overheads. They do not utilize a latch accurate simu-
lation infrastructure, and instead focus on much larger scale applications, resulting in
work that inherently resides at a higher abstraction level than ours.
Fault injection is sometimes performed at the software level, which can be less ex-
pensive but also less precise than hardware fault injection. FERRARI by Kanawati et
al. [4] and JIFI by Some et al. [15] are two examples of tools that use software fault
injection to research fault tolerance via corruption of the process control structure.
Physical fault injection via particle bombardment or radiation is another alternative
methodology. This technique requires the use of expensive resources that few can ob-
tain, and error observation is limited to a very high level. However, of all fault injection
techniques it most accurately mimics an authentic soft-error environment and, unlike
software and hardware simulation, provides raw failure probability numbers. Lide´n et
al. [10] perform one such physical fault injection study using heavy-ion circuit radiation
to quantify the probability of transient error manifestation in memory elements.
4.2 Processor Vulnerability Estimation
Some research has been dedicated to finding the architectural vulnerability factors (AVF)
of various structures in a processor [11] [1] [16]. These studies assess the probability
of architectural fault masking through statistical analysis or ACE determination (iden-
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tifying bits of state that must be correct for architecturally correct execution). Wang et
al. [17] again use fault injection to quantify the conservatism of ACE analysis.
Others have developed their own methodologies for the analytical assessment of
SER. Li et al. [9] propose SoftArch, a tool for estimating the mean time to failure
(MTTF) of an architecture using probabilistic models for error generation and propa-
gation. Zhang and Shanbhag [19] introduce SERA, a soft error rate analysis approach
using conditional probabilities extracted from circuit simulations with applied graph
theory. Nguyen and Yagil [12] describe an approach using the timing and logic derating
of a circuit to estimate the FIT rate of each processor element.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The threat of transient fault pollution is ubiquitous and must be addressed by modern
processor architects. We have presented a fault injection methodology uniquely capable
of capturing the microarchitectural behavior of soft errors at a detailed level, and have
demonstrated its results in a new IBM processor core. We utilize a verification tool
combined with four TST applications of various complexities to observe the behavior
of our host architecture in the presence of individual soft errors at latch outputs. Less
than 20% of all faults are found to propagate into user-visible errors for any given TST.
When taking into consideration the fact that a few latches have already been designed
to be resilient against soft errors and removing these from our dataset, reliability im-
proves by an average of 4%. State miscompares are the most common type of failure,
followed by inconsistencies in the hardware and software caches. We determine that the
execution unit is the most vulnerable processor component, although the exact source of
susceptibility varies with TST. Multi-threaded TSTs in general yield higher failure rates
than single-threaded ones in almost every category. The majority of errors are detected
shortly after injection, although the percentage of total runs that pass at any given time
is application dependent. Finally, we investigate the behavior of a single floating point
latch and find that rounding artifacts create fail rate nonuniformity.
To improve reliability for this processor, SPRs and other state latches should be
protected, either by changing the physical characteristics of the latches themselves or
by employing error detection or correction techniques such as parity or ECC. ECC is a
high overhead solution and perhaps not worthwhile for smaller latches, but a larger tech-
nology decreases performance. If the decision to improve latch resilience is to be made
anywhere, however, it should be made for SPRs, to avoid permanent fault manifestation
whenever possible. In addition, clock gating should be universally installed in every unit
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so that errors are not unintentionally propagated when the latches are not in use. This has
the obvious additional advantage of reducing power consumption. The execution unit
should be a primary target, especially because it contains the largest number of latches
in the design. The instruction unit and floating point unit have room for improvement as
well, and both should be fully investigated for maximum processor robustness.
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